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INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether minimum wages, and minimum wage increases, lead to falls in 
employment and/or hours worked continues to attract significant interest among both policy 
makers and researchers. It is particularly pertinent not only in the US where some cities have 
substantially increased minimum wages over recent years, but also in the UK given the recent 
introduction of the National Living Wage (NLW) for those aged 25 and over and its planned 
uprating to reach 60% of national median wages over the next few years. The April 2016 
introduction of the NLW was itself a big change, corresponding to an overnight increase of 
7.5% in the minimum wage rate for the 25+ age group, or an increase in the bite of the UK 
minimum wage for the relevant age group from 52.5% of the UK median wage at the April 
2015 NMW mid-year point to an estimated 55.8% by the October 2016 NLW mid-year point 
(Low Pay Commission, 2016).  
There is an extensive international body of evidence on the employment and hours effects of 
minimum wages, employing a range of methods in a range of contexts and coming to a variety 
of conclusions. Even reviews of this literature have drawn mixed conclusions (e.g. contrast 
Neumark & Wascher (2006) with Schmitt (2013)). Nonetheless, inasmuch as there is a 
consensus in the international literature it is probably that the employment and hours effects of 
modest minimum wage increases are typically small and possibly zero. UK evidence points to 
a similar lack of employment responsiveness to minimum wage increases overall, although 
there is some evidence of employment impacts for some particular groups and sectors (e.g. see 
the reviews of de Linde Leonard et al., 2014; Low Pay Commission, 2016) and of small effects 
on hours (Stewart and Swaffield, 2008).  
This paper examines the employment and hours impacts of two key UK minimum wage policy 
changes, specifically for Northern Ireland (NI): (i) the original introduction of the NMW in 
4 
 
April 1999 and (ii) the introduction of the NLW for 25s and over in April 2016. Our motivation 
for focusing on NI is threefold. First, NI is a relatively low-wage region where minimum wages 
have more bite. For example, the bite of the NLW in NI in mid-year 2016 was already estimated 
to be well over 60%, and the second highest of all the UK regions (Low Pay Commission, 
2016). Given that international evidence suggests that the employment and/or hours effects of 
minimum wages are partly dependent on the extent to which such minimum wages bite, then 
such effects may be more likely in NI than in higher-wage regions of the UK. Second, NI is 
the only part of the UK where there is a jurisdictional border reflected in a substantial 
discontinuity in minimum wage rates but (arguably) a reasonable degree of labour market 
comparability otherwise, at least in terms of changes over the periods of interest, i.e. the land 
border with the Republic of Ireland (RoI). This enables, for the first time, a quasi-experimental 
approach to estimating NMW and NLW impacts on employment and hours which exploits the 
RoI as a comparison group. Third, despite the potential for minimum wage impacts on 
employment and hours in NI, there is no existing study that seeks to estimate such effects 
against a defined counterfactual. In all three respects this paper makes a contribution to the 
wider empirical literature on minimum wages and, potentially, also to contemporary UK policy 
advice regarding minimum wage impacts.  
Specifically, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis of the employment and hours 
impacts of both the NMW and NLW introductions, with the RoI as the comparison group, 
exploiting comparable cross-sectional unit record data available quarterly in both jurisdictions 
from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) (NI) and the Quarterly National Household 
Survey (QNHS) (RoI). The RoI did not introduce a national minimum wage until April 2000, 
and more recently, the introduction of the NLW in NI in April 2016 was not echoed by any 
contemporaneous increase in the RoI minimum wage, although the RoI increased its own 
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national minimum wage on 1st January 2016. Before and after periods for this quasi-
experimental approach are therefore defined as in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: The Introduction of the NMW and NLW as Natural Experiments 
 Before After 
NMW Introduction, 22+ 1998Q2-1999Q1 1999Q2-2000Q1 
  NI Minimum Hourly Wage n/a £3.60 
  RoI Minimum Hourly Wage n/a n/a 
NLW Introduction, 25+ 2015Q4-2016Q1 2016Q2-2016Q3 
  NI Minimum Hourly Wage £6.70 £7.20 
  RoI Minimum Hourly Wage €8.65 (2015Q4),  
€9.15 (2016Q1) 
€9.15 
Note: In sensitivity analysis we also explore exclusion of 2015Q4 in the ‘before’ period for the introduction of 
the NLW.  
 
I. EXISTING RESEARCH 
Economic theory is ambiguous about the employment and hours impacts of minimum wages 
because predicted effects depend on the market context in which they are introduced. As 
pointed out by Butcher (2012), in a perfectly competitive labour market theory suggests that 
firms would reduce the amount of labour employed through reductions in employment (the 
extensive margin) or hours (the intensive margin) or both in response to a minimum wage set 
above the market-clearing wage. In contrast, in a monopsonistic labour market, or a labour 
market where higher wages induce greater productivity through efficiency wage effects, theory 
suggests that minimum wages may even have a positive impact on employment or hours.  
This theoretical ambiguity is one of the factors that have led to a vast international empirical 
literature on the employment and hours effects of minimum wages, employing a range of 
methods in a range of contexts – although much of it focussed on the US – and coming to a 
6 
 
variety of conclusions. Some early studies found negative employment effects (e.g. Brown et 
al., 1982; Neumark et al., 2004), while others (notably Card and Krueger, 1994; also Card et 
al., 1994) found positive employment effects. Even reviews of this literature have drawn mixed 
conclusions (e.g. contrast Neumark & Wascher (2006) with Schmitt (2013)). Inasmuch as there 
is a consensus in the international literature, however, it is probably that employment effects 
of modest minimum wage increases are typically small or possibly zero. Although fewer 
studies examine hours, there is perhaps slightly more weight of evidence of negative hours 
effects among low-paid workers in the US (e.g. see Couch & Witttenburg, 2001; Belman et al., 
2015), but again there are counter-examples (e.g. Zavodny, 2000). 
UK evidence points to a similar lack of employment responsiveness to minimum wage 
increases overall, although there is some evidence of impacts for some particular groups (see 
Dickens et al. (2015) on part-time women), particular sectors (see Machin et al. (2003) on the 
residential care sector) and again on hours (see Stewart & Swaffield, 2008). Reviews of this 
literature are provided by de Linde Leonard et al. (2014) and various Low Pay Commission 
reports (e.g. Low Pay Commission, 2016). Because the UK minimum wage was introduced at 
the same time across the whole country, and has subsequently been uprated across the whole 
country at the same points in time, UK researchers have had to be creative to generate plausible 
counterfactuals by which to identify employment and hours effects. Among the more credible 
methods employed are difference-in-differences comparing low-wage workers with those 
higher up the wage distribution (e.g. Stewart, 2002) and regression discontinuity comparing 
outcomes either side of age thresholds (e.g. Dickens et al., 2014).  
Very little is known about the impact of the NMW or NLW on employment and hours 
specifically in NI. We know from UK-wide analysis that the bite of the NMW and NLW is 
higher in NI than in most other regions of the UK (e.g. Low Pay Commission, 2016), a fact 
that has been exploited for identification of its impacts by a number of the studies cited above, 
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starting with Stewart (2002). There is also a descriptive statistical report by the relevant NI 
government department, published in autumn 2016 following the introduction of the NLW, 
which estimates the number of workers likely to be affected by the NLW introduction and how 
this varies across groups and sectors (Department for the Economy, 2016). It uses Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) data from 2014/15 to estimate that around 8% of 
employees in NI were likely to be directly affected by the introduction of the NLW, with 
disproportionate impacts on female workers, part-time workers, young workers (aged 25-34) 
and those in certain sectors, reflecting the wider variations in bite at the national level. This 
existing report, however, does not consider impacts on employment or hours.  
It is also the case that very little is known with regard to the impact of the minimum wage in 
RoI on outcome variables such as hours worked or employment.  Nolan et al. (2002), which 
collected longitudinal data on a sample of firms in Ireland in 1998 and 2001 to assess the impact 
of the 2000 introduction of the RoI minimum wage on employment, found no impact with 
respect to employment growth at a general level, but a lower rate of employment growth among 
the very small percentage of firms employing high proportions of workers covered by the new 
minimum wage.  A more recent study by McGuinness and Redmond (2018) adopts a difference 
in difference framework to analyse the impact of the NMW increase from €8.65 to €9.15 in 
January 2016. They find that while the rate rise had no detectable impact on employment, it 
did result in a reduction of one hour per week in the number of hours worked. The fall in hours 
worked was particularly pronounced, at -3.5 hours, among minimum wage workers on 
temporary contracts.   
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II.  DATA AND APPROACH TO ESTIMATION 
This paper exploits unit record data drawn from two national, representative, quarterly 
household surveys – the QLFS and the QNHS – which are treated as repeated cross-sections. 
Both surveys provide detailed information for large samples of individuals in identified 
households quarterly from 1998Q2 through to the latest available quarter, with the QLFS 
sample size large enough to make quarterly analysis specifically for NI feasible, at least overall 
if not for narrowly-defined sub-groups. Once we restrict samples to working age individuals – 
age 22-59/64 for the introduction of the NMW and 25-59/64 for the introduction of the NLW 
– we are left with quarterly sample sizes of around 2,700 for NI around the introduction of the 
NMW and around 1,700 for NI around the introduction of the NLW.  The equivalent QNHS 
sample sizes for the RoI are around 55,000 per quarter around the introduction of the UK NMW 
and around 21,000 per quarter around the introduction of the UK NLW.    
To analyse the introduction of the NMW in April 1999 there are four quarters of data available 
both pre-treatment (from 1998Q2-1999Q1) and post-treatment (from 1999Q2-2000Q1), from 
both surveys, where no other minimum wage changes took place either in NI or RoI (2000Q2 
saw the introduction of the Republic of Ireland’s own minimum wage.) This is our window of 
observation for the NMW analysis described in the following sections. The usable window of 
observation around the introduction of the NLW in April 2016 is narrower for two reasons. 
First, the UK (including NI) uprated the NMW in October 2015 and again in October 2016, 
although the latter change did not directly affect those aged 25+ given the NMW rate still fell 
below the NLW rate. Second, there was a large increase in the RoI minimum wage from 1st 
January 2016 (from €8.65 to €9.15). In what follows we restrict our analysis to data drawn 
from the two quarters prior to the NLW introduction and the two quarters following its 
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introduction, i.e. from 2015Q4 to 2016Q3, although we test sensitivity to further restrictions 
given the potentially confounding other minimum wage changes in this case.  
Because the QNHS evolved from the RoI’s own LFS there is a high degree of compatibility 
between the two data sources, both of which use similar sampling frames and contain 
information on economic activity, hours worked and other job characteristics, as well as some 
demographic and household characteristics. Note, however, that the QNHS has very limited 
information on pay – household income bands only – so hourly pay / wage data cannot be 
derived for the RoI from this source. In contrast, two measures of hourly pay are potentially 
available for NI from the QLFS, although neither is ideal: HOURPAY and HRRATE. The 
former is derived by ONS from hours and earnings data recorded elsewhere in the QLFS 
survey, has good coverage for those in employment, and is available for analysis of both the 
introduction of the NMW and the introduction of the NLW. The trade-off for its good coverage 
is noise. As a result studies specifically of the wage effects of UK minimum wage upratings 
have tended to use data from the ASHE (see Low Pay Commission, 2016). An alternative 
variable available in the QLFS since spring 1999 – so available for analysis of the wage effects 
of the introduction of the NLW but not the NMW – is HRRATE, which refers to the basic 
hourly rate of respondents whose last pay period was less than monthly. This restriction, and 
the fact that it is asked in all quarters but only for respondents who are in the first or last wave 
of their five-quarter rotation in the QLFS sample, means coverage is far less complete than in 
the case of HOURPAY. The trade-off for lower coverage is an hourly wage measure that is 
perceived by some to be more accurate than HOURPAY (e.g. Ormerod and Ritchie, 2007). 
The lack of wage data for the RoI and the less than ideal wage data for NI, however, means we 
do not present a first-stage analysis of the impact of the NMW or NLW on wages in this paper.   
Instead, the key outcome variables used in the descriptive and/or econometric analysis are as 
follows: 
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Employment: The standard ILO definition as in the QLFS variable ILODEFR and the QNHS 
variable ILO is used to measure whether an individual is employed during the reference period. 
Note that, because they cannot be reliably separately identified in the QNHS, the self-employed 
– not covered by the NMW or NLW – are included along with employees here.  
Weekly hours worked: The paper focuses primarily on total usual weekly hours in the main job, 
including overtime. The relevant variable in the QLFS (QNHS) is TTUSHR (HWUSUAL). 
Estimates are also provided for total actual hours worked in the last week (TTACHR / 
HWACTUAL), although this measure is complicated by zeroes for those on holiday or off 
work for other reasons in the previous week.  
These variables, along with all the controls used in the econometric analysis, are listed and 
defined in Table A1.  
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics – sample means and proportions and standard 
deviations for continuous variables – for the respondents north and south of the border, before 
and after both reforms. In most respects the composition of the NI and RoI samples appears 
very similar. Where there are differences – whether reflecting genuine differences in outcomes 
or characteristics, or differences in the precise definition of variables or categorisation of 
responses between the two surveys – e.g. in average actual weekly hours around the 
introduction of the NMW or in education levels around the introduction of the NLW, they are 
time-invariant over the periods under consideration, and therefore will not confound estimated 
NMW/NLW impacts. Note the three percentage point increase in the employment rate in the 
RoI between the pre-NMW and post-NMW periods, however, which is not reflected in an 
increased employment rate in NI. One potential explanation for this divergence, which we 
explore in the following section, is that it is picking up a negative employment impact of the 
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NMW in NI against a counterfactual increasing trend. There is no such divergence in 
employment rates at the time of the introduction of the NLW.  
 
Table 2: Sample Means / Proportions (Standard Deviations) for Outcomes and Other 
Observable Characteristics, NI and RoI, Pre and Post Introduction of NMW 
 
NI RoI 
 
1998Q2-
1999Q1 
1999Q2-
2000Q1 
1998Q2-
1999Q1 
1999Q2-
2000Q1 
Employment rate 22-59/64 0.70 
 
0.70 0.69 0.72 
Total actual weekly hours in main job 34.6 
(18.0) 
 
35.0 
(17.9) 
40.4 
(14.8) 
40.1 
(14.5) 
Total usual weekly hours in main job 
 
39.6 
(13.5) 
 
39.5 
(13.9) 
39.1 
(12.7) 
38.7 
(12.0) 
Proportion of employed in minimum wage sector 
 
0.31 0.30 0.26 0.26 
Male 0.51 
 
0.51 0.52 0.52 
Age, years 40.0 
(11.3) 
 
40.2 
(11.2) 
39.7 
(11.3) 
39.8 
(11.3) 
Single 0.27 
 
0.27 0.32 0.33 
Married / cohabiting 0.63 
 
0.63 0.62 0.61 
Widowed/divorced 0.05 
 
0.05 0.06 0.06 
Number of children <18 in household 1.07 
(1.27) 
 
1.04 
(1.26) 
1.09 
(1.32) 
1.05 
(1.29) 
Nobs 11,366 11,552 220,795 219,934 
Note: Estimates are weighted for non-response using pwt07 (QLFS) and gf (QNHS) and based on the full set of 
information available for each variable. Variables are defined in Table A1.  
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Table 3: Sample Means (standard deviations) for Outcomes and Other Observable 
Characteristics, NI and RoI, Pre and Post Introduction of NLW 
 
NI RoI 
 
2015Q4-
2016Q1 
2016Q2-
2016Q3 
2015Q4-
2016Q1 
2016Q2-
2016Q3 
Employment rate 25-59/64 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.73 
Total actual weekly hours in main job 32.5 
(16.6) 
 
33.6 
(16.7) 
 
35.6 
(13.0) 
 
36.8 
(12.8) 
 
Total usual weekly hours in main job 
 
37.5 
(12.1) 
 
37.6 
(12.6) 
 
36.5 
(11.6) 
 
36.8 
(11.4) 
 
Proportion of employed in minimum wage sector 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.32 
Male 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.52 
Age, years 43.0 
(10.7) 
 
43.1 
(10.7) 
 
42.5 
(10.4) 
 
42.5 
(10.4) 
 
Single 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.35 
Married / cohabiting 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.58 
Widowed/divorced 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
Number of children <18 in household 0.91 
(1.12) 
 
0.90 
(1.13) 
 
0.97 
(1.20) 
 
0.96 
(1.20) 
 
ISCED1 0.22 0.22 0.06 0.06 
ISCED2 0.22 0.20 0.11 0.12 
ISCED3-4 0.22 0.21 0.15 0.15 
ISCED5 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.12 
ISCED6 0.24 0.26 0.30 0.30 
Nobs 3,430 3,832 42,170 41,961 
Note: Estimates are weighted for non-response using pwt16 (QLFS) and gf (QNHS) and based on the full set of 
information available for each variable. Variables are defined in Table A1.   
 
In common with many previous studies of minimum wage effects internationally, including 
the seminal study of Card and Krueger (1994), differences across space are exploited here to 
identify impacts on employment and hours. In particular differences in the timing of the 
introduction and uprating of the NMW, NLW in NI and their counterpart in the RoI are 
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exploited. The NMW and NLW introductions north of the border are, in effect, treated as 
natural experiments – individuals in NI are the treatment group and individuals in RoI are the 
control group – and their impacts estimated using a standard difference-in-differences approach 
(see Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). Specifically, linear regressions of the following form are 
estimated:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖.𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where, 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the outcome variable of interest (employment or log hours) for individual i in country 
c at time t; 
𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is a dummy for individuals living in a household within NI; 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 are quarterly fixed effects common to both NI and RoI;  
𝛿𝛿 is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), averaged over all post-reform periods;  
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable for whether the quarter is in the post-reform period (i.e. post 
NMW or post NLW); 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 contains individual and household observed characteristics;  
and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a stochastic error term capturing other influences. 
For (log) hours we estimate the model by ordinary least squares (OLS) and 𝛿𝛿 gives the 
percentage change in average hours among the NI sample driven by the NMW or NLW 
introduction. For employment, where the outcome is binary, for ease of interpretation we also 
estimate by OLS, with 𝛿𝛿 interpreted as the impact of the NMW or NLW introduction on the 
probability of employment among the NI sample. We also explore sensitivity of the key 
employment estimates to adopting a logit specification, in which case we present marginal 
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effects of the NMW or NLW introduction on the probability of employment which are 
interpretable in the same way. 
Because minimum wage impacts on employment or hours may not be instantaneous and may 
vary over the post-reform period, we also estimate an extended version of (1) which allows 
for dynamic treatment effects as follows: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + �𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝(𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖.𝑝𝑝)𝑄𝑄
𝑝𝑝=1
+ 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (2) 
where 𝑝𝑝  is a series of quarter dummy indicators for each of the post-reform quarters.  
A crucial identifying assumption using difference-in-differences estimation is that the 
treatment and control groups are following parallel paths, also known as common trends, 
which in this case means that in the absence of the introduction of the NMW or NLW in NI, 
outcomes would have followed a path that is parallel to that observed in RoI. While this 
assumption is untestable, the standard procedure in the literature is to check the plausibility of 
the assumption by testing whether the treatment and control group outcomes at least follow 
parallel paths prior to the reform. One potential driver of diverging prior trends is anticipation 
effects in NI following the announcement of – June 1998 and July 2015 respectively – but 
ahead of the implementation of the NMW/NLW. Other potential confounding factors that 
might drive diverging prior trends include the faster growth rate of the RoI economy relative 
to the NI economy in each of the years 1998, 1999, 2015 and 2016, changes in the £/€ 
exchange rate around both the NMW and NLW introductions, and anticipation effects 
surrounding the Brexit referendum in the run up to the introduction of the NLW (we return to 
these potential confounders later).    
Diverging trends can be tested by estimating the dynamic model over the pre-reform period, 
similar to equation (2), except 𝑝𝑝 is a series of quarterly dummy indicators for each of the pre-
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reform periods. This is straightforward for the introduction of the NMW – both jurisdictions 
had no minimum wage in the four quarters (or before) prior to 1999Q2, and RoI didn’t 
introduce its minimum wage until 2000Q2. It is less so for the introduction of the NLW in 
2016Q2 because the RoI minimum wage was uprated from €8.65 to €9.15 in 2016Q1. 
Nevertheless we examine the two quarters prior to 2016Q2 on the assumption that the changes 
in employment and hours in the RoI induced by the uprating of the ROI minimum wage in 
2016Q1 were negligible. McGuinness and Redmond (2018) provide support for this 
assumption in the case of employment, although they cannot rule out a small hours impact of 
the January 2016 uprating of the RoI minimum wage.   
Estimated coefficients and robust standard errors for NI-quarter interactions in each case (i.e.  
𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝) and p-values for the corresponding tests of their joint significance are presented in Table 
4. In both cases – the introduction of the NMW and the introduction of the NLW – there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null of parallel trends for employment or for hours. We 
therefore proceed on the basis that the assumption of common trends holds in all cases here, 
although we return to this point in Section III. The estimates in Table 4 can also be interpreted 
as null estimates for placebo tests in each of the quarters prior to the actual introduction of the 
NMW and NLW. i Note that although we cannot rule out that the standard errors reported in 
Table 4 are under-estimated – they are robust but not clustered, and we return to this point in 
Section III – this would likely lead us to over-reject rather than under-reject the null of no 
parallel trends. 
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Table 4: Testing for Parallel Prior Trends – Difference-in-difference Estimates for the Pre-
treatment Periods, Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors) 
𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝 Employment Weekly hours 
Introduction of the NMW   
1998Q2 ref. case ref. case 
1998Q3 -0.014 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.014)  
  
1998Q4 -0.003 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.014)  
  
1999Q1 -0.016 
(0.012) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
   
𝐹𝐹𝛿𝛿1998Q3=𝛿𝛿1998Q4=𝛿𝛿1999Q1=0 [p-value] 0.83 
[0.48] 
0.97 
[0.41] 
   
Nobs 232,161 139,351 
 
Introduction of the NLW    
2015Q4 ref. case ref. case 
2016Q1 -0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
   
Nobs 45,600 30,703 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. These represent coefficients on interaction 
terms between the dummy variable for NI and individual quarter dummies. All models are estimated with a full 
set of controls (as listed and defined in Table A1).   
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III. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ANALYSIS 
Baseline Estimates 
Table 5 presents our baseline difference-in-difference estimates of the employment and hours 
impacts of the introduction of the NMW in NI using the RoI as the comparison group. Only 
the key estimated parameters are reported here; full results are given in the appendix.ii First 
consider employment. The first row gives the estimated impact of the NMW introduction on 
employment, averaged over the first four quarters following its introduction. The estimate 
suggests that the NMW was associated with a fall in employment in NI, with employment in 
the year following its introduction almost two percentage points lower than we estimate would 
otherwise have been the case. This is broadly similar in magnitude to the negative impact of 
the NMW introduction on employment retention of part-time women (three percentage points) 
reported by Dickens et al. (2015), and corresponds to around 20,000 individuals (out of a 
working age population of approximately one million) who might otherwise have been in 
employment.  
The next four rows of Table 5 present quarter-specific estimates of NMW impacts on 
employment. The magnitudes of these estimates are reasonably stable around the -1.9 
percentage point average, with at most a slight trend increase in the estimated NMW impact on 
employment over the year, consistent with the NMW impacting in part via employment growth 
(see Meer and West, 2016).  
Turning to estimated impacts of the NMW on hours (column 2 of Table 5) we see no clear 
evidence of any impact. The estimated impact averaged over the first year following the NMW 
introduction is very close to zero in magnitude and is nowhere near statistical significance. 
Neither is there any clear estimated impact in the quarter-specific estimates, all of which are 
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statistically insignificant and very small, ranging in magnitude from +0.013 to -0.015 (i.e. 
approximately +/- half an hour).  
 
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NMW Introduction on 
Employment and Hours in NI, Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors) 
  Employment Weekly hours 
   
Constant treatment effect (1999Q2-2000Q1) -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.007)  
  
Time-varying treatment effect   
1999Q2 -0.017* 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
   
1999Q3 -0.014 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.011)  
  
1999Q4 -0.020** 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.011)  
  
2000Q1 -0.025*** 
(0.009) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
   
   
Nobs 463,647 298,473 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. Covariates listed 
in Table A1 are included in the model and full estimates for the constant treatment effects models are presented 
in Table A2. 
 
Table 6 repeats the exercise for the introduction of the NLW in 2016Q2. In this case there is 
very little evidence of any NLW impact on employment in NI, with the two-quarter point 
estimate very close to zero and nowhere near statistical significance. As shown by rows 2 and 
3, neither is there any evidence of an employment effect that accumulates – via employment 
growth – over time following the NLW introduction, although the caveat here is that we have 
data for only two post-NLW quarters  Similarly, for hours, there is no clear evidence here of 
any impact from the introduction of the NLW. The point estimate in the first row is small and 
not statistically significant at conventional levels. The quarter-specific estimates are also 
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statistically insignificant, although the estimate for 2016Q3 is larger in magnitude at -1.9% 
(although this still only corresponds to around two thirds of one hour), and is approaching the 
margin of conventional levels of statistical significance, at least given the standard errors 
reported here. 
 
Table 6: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NLW Introduction on 
Employment and Hours in NI, Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors) 
  Employment Weekly hours 
   
Constant treatment effect (2016Q2-2016Q3) -0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.011)  
  
Time-varying treatment effect   
2016Q2 -0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
   
2016Q3 0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.019 
(0.013)  
      
  
Nobs 91,393 61,550 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. Covariates listed 
in Table A1 are included in the model and full estimates for the constant treatment effects models are presented 
in Table A3. 
 
 
Heterogeneous Minimum Wage Effects?  
Table 7 presents the key parameters from re-estimating (1) on subsamples split by gender, age 
and education level (the latter only for the introduction of the NLW given unavailability of data 
for the earlier period in the QNHS). There is no evidence of heterogeneity in the employment 
effect of the introduction of the NMW; the estimated two percentage point decline in the 
employment rate is common to men and women and to the younger and older age groups. 
Similarly the estimated zero impacts of the NLW on employment, and of both the NMW and 
NLW on hours, are common to men and women, older and younger workers, and lower and 
higher-qualified workers; all estimates, for all groups, are small and statistically insignificant.  
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Table 7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NMW and NLW Introductions 
on Employment and Hours in NI, Heterogeneous Effects, Constant Treatment Effects, 
Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors) 
 NMW Introduction NLW Introduction 
  Employment 
Weekly 
hours Employment 
Weekly 
hours 
     
Baseline -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.001 
(0.007) 
 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
 
-0.011 
(0.011) 
 
Men -0.020** 
(.008) 
0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.013) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
     
Women -0.019** 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.027 
(0.018)  
    
Age 22-34 / 25-34 -0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.011 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.019) 
-0.020 
(0.019)  
    
Age 35-59/64 -0.019*** 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.009 
(0.013)  
    
Higher qualification level - - -0.005 (0.012) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
     
Lower qualification level - - -0.001 (0.018) 
0.002 
(0.023) 
     
(Share of those employed who 
are) employed in minimum 
wage sector 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.021) 
     
     
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. Covariates listed 
in Table A1 – with the exception of the relevant dummy on which the sample is restricted – are also included in 
each model. The models are estimated under the parallel paths assumption in each case.  
 
 
Next (in the absence of good quality wage data) we examine whether the NMW or NLW 
impacted disproportionately on three sectors with high concentrations of minimum wage 
workers in both NI and the RoI (wholesale & retail trade, accommodation & food, and human 
health & social work)iii. First we estimate the impact of the NMW and NLW on the 
employment share in these sectors, i.e. whether the NMW/NLW led to any reallocation of 
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employment across sectors. For both the NMW and NLW the resulting estimates are negative, 
but small and statistically insignificant, suggesting in the case of the NMW that the reduction 
in employment was spread evenly between these and other sectors, and in the case of the NLW 
that there was no substantial reallocation of employment obscured by the overall zero 
employment effect. Second, we restrict the sample to those employed in these sectors and re-
estimate the NMW/NLW impacts on hours. Again both estimates are small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant, suggesting no hours impacts even in these sectors.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis and Potential Threats to Identification and Inference  
Table 8 presents the key parameter estimates from a number of sensitivity analyses.  
1. We re-estimate the employment models as logit models rather than LPMs, given the binary 
nature of the outcome variable.  
2. We re-estimate the baseline model excluding the quarter prior to the NMW and NLW 
introductions in each case to test sensitivity to possible anticipation effects.  
3. We re-estimate the baseline model excluding 2015Q4 in the NLW case to test sensitivity to 
potential effects of the RoI uprating of its own minimum wage on1st January 2016.  
4. We re-estimate hours effects using total actual hours in the reference week rather than total 
usual hours.  
5. We re-estimate the baseline models allowing standard errors to be clustered at the NUTS3 
level using a wild cluster bootstrap approach (with 1000 draws) as suggested by Cameron 
and Miller (2015).iv  
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Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis, Constant Treatment Effects, Coefficients (Robust St. Errors) 
 NMW Introduction NLW Introduction 
  Employment 
Weekly 
hours Employment 
Weekly 
hours 
     
Baseline -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.011 
(0.011)  
    
Baseline as logit (m. effects) -0.020*** 
(0.006) 
 
- -0.0002 
(0.011) 
- 
     
Exclude 1999Q1 -0.022*** 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
- - 
     
Exclude 2015Q4 - - -0.00001 
(0.012) 
-0.007 
(0.014)  
    
Exclude 2016Q1 - - -0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.013)  
    
Total actual hours - -0.005 
(0.008) 
- -0.018 
(0.012) 
     
Estimated with wild-bootstrap 
clustered st. errors [p-value] 
-0.019*** 
[0.002] 
0.001 
[0.656] 
-0.001 
[0.600] 
-0.011*** 
[0.002] 
     
     
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Covariates listed in Table A1 are included in 
each model. Wild-bootstrap standard errors are clustered at the NUTS 3 regional level.  
 
 
 
Table 8 shows that the coefficient estimates presented in Table 6 for the employment and hours 
effects of the introduction of the NLW are highly robust; for each outcome the estimates from 
the range of variants of the model are small. They are also statistically indistinguishable from 
zero in all cases except where we bootstrap clustered standard errors for the hours effect, which 
in this case appears to exacerbate any under-estimation of standard errors (we return to this 
point below). The same holds – in this case with no exceptions – for the estimated hours impact 
of the introduction of the NMW, which is robustly very small and nowhere statistically 
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significant. Similarly, the estimated 2 percentage point impact on employment of the NMW is 
robust.  
Although our estimates are robust and we find no evidence of diverging prior trends, parallel 
assumptions may still be violated, and our estimates potentially subject to bias, if there are 
confounding sources of divergence in the quarters coinciding with or immediately following 
the NMW/NLW introductions. (This is, after all, a simple ‘two-by-two’ difference-in-
differences approach.) Although we cannot test for this, we can at least consider the most 
likely sign of any potential bias. The two most obvious potential culprits in 1999 – higher 
economic growth rates in RoI than NI and a 10% appreciation of Sterling relative to the Euro 
over the year – would most likely bias our estimated NMW employment effect in a negative 
direction, implying that the two percentage point estimated employment effect may be an 
upper bound on the absolute magnitude of any negative NMW effect. We therefore moderate 
our conclusion to the following: that the introduction of the NMW led to a small decrease in 
the employment rate of 22-59/64 year olds in NI of up to two percentage points. It is less 
clear how these potential confounders might bias estimated hours impacts of the NMW, if at 
all, but neither provides a strong case for overturning the zero hours effect conclusion. This 
lack of a strong case for overturning zero estimates also holds for the estimated NLW 
employment and hours impacts. In this more recent case the RoI was also growing faster than 
NI in 2016 and there was a dip in business and consumer confidence in 2016Q3 (although 
subsequently reversed) following the Brexit referendum result in the UK, both of which 
might suggest any possible bias to estimated employment effects would be negative. On the 
other hand, the exchange rate was moving in the opposite direction (most notably in the 
fortnight following the Brexit referendum), potentially offsetting any such bias at least in 
part.  
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In addition to these remaining concerns about the unbiasedness of the point estimates, we 
cannot rule out that standard errors are under-estimated here, both in the baseline estimates 
(with robust but not clustered standard errors) and in the alternative set of estimates where we 
allow standard errors to be clustered at the NUTS3 level using a wild cluster bootstrap 
approach. The reason we relegate the estimates with clustered standard errors to the 
sensitivity analysis is that there is no ideal clustering in this case – again, this is a ‘two-by-
two’ difference-in-differences – and the fact that the estimated clustered standard errors are 
smaller than the robust standard errors suggests the NUTS3 level clustering exacerbates 
rather than mitigates any under-estimation problems. The bottom line is that this threat to 
inference again leads us to moderate our conclusion of the NMW impact on employment 
from a decrease of two percentage points to a decrease of up to two percentage points. On the 
other hand it gives no additional reason to question the conclusion of zero NMW impact on 
hours and zero NLW impacts on hours and employment.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents estimates of employment and hours impacts in NI of the introductions of 
the UK NMW and NLW, using the RoI – where minimum wages were not introduced until 
2000Q2 and were constant at the time of the introduction of the NLW – to generate the relevant 
counterfactuals in each case. It is the first study to exploit the UK’s only land border in order 
to identify minimum wage effects and the first study to estimate minimum wage impacts on 
employment and hours in NI – one of the lowest-wage regions of the UK – against a defined 
counterfactual.  
We find that the NMW is associated with a decrease in the employment rate of 22-59/64 year 
olds in NI, of up to two percentage points, in the year following its introduction. The magnitude 
25 
 
of this effect is small but non-trivial, corresponding to a loss of up to 20,000 jobs in NI. We 
describe this effect as ‘up to’ two percentage points rather than two percentage points 
unequivocally because we cannot entirely rule out asymmetric shocks in the period following 
the introduction of the NMW that could have biased the estimated effect downwards and 
because we cannot rule out that the standard errors are under-estimated leading to potential 
over-rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect. The estimated employment coefficient, 
however, is robust to a series of sensitivity checks. We (again robustly) find no evidence of an 
impact of the introduction of the NLW on employment in NI in the six months following its 
introduction, and no evidence of impacts of either the NMW or NLW introductions on weekly 
hours worked in NI. Threats to inference from correlated standard errors are less relevant in 
these cases since we already fail to reject the null.  
In presenting new, albeit tentative, evidence of a negative employment effect of the 
introduction of the NMW in 1999 in a low-wage region, this paper adds to the small group of 
existing UK studies to have found similar employment effects among particular low-wage 
groups of workers or in particular low-wage sectors. The conclusion of the UK literature to 
date – that there has been no overall negative employment effect of the NMW at the national 
level – should be tempered by these low-wage group, sectoral and now possibly regional 
exceptions. In presenting new evidence of zero employment and hours impacts of the 2016 
introduction of the NLW in NI, however, this paper shows that any negative employment 
impact of the introduction of the original NMW in NI was not repeated in 2016, despite NI’s 
continuing position as a relatively low-wage UK region. These latter estimates are more in line 
with the bulk of the literature on the UK minimum wage providing estimates at the national 
level.  
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Appendix: Further Data Details and Additional Results 
Table A1: Variable Definitions and Descriptions 
Variable Definition Description 
Outcome Variables   
Employment  
 
 
Employment in minimum wage sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total actual weekly hours in main job 
 
 
 
 
Total usual weekly hours in main job 
Employed in the 
reference week 
 
Those employed in 
the reference week in 
sectors with high 
concentrations of 
minimum wage 
workers 
 
Total actual hours 
worked in main job in 
the reference week 
including overtime 
 
Total usual hours 
worked in main job 
including overtime 
Employed in the reference 
week = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Employed in the following 
sectors: UK SIC07 G, I & Q =  1, 
0 if employed in other sectors* 
 
 
 
 
This variable is constructed 
from TTACHR from the QLFS 
and HWACTUAL from QNHS 
 
 
This variable is constructed 
from TTUSHR from the QLFS 
and HWUSUAL from QNHS 
   
Controls   
Male 
 
Age, years 
 
 
Age squared 
 
 
Single 
 
 
Married/cohabiting 
 
 
 
Widowed 
 
 
Divorced 
 
 
No. of Children under age of 18 in 
household 
 
 
Sex of respondent 
 
Age of respondent in 
years 
 
Age of respondent in 
years, squared 
 
Respondent’s marital 
status is single  
 
Respondent’s marital 
status is married/ 
cohabiting 
 
Respondent’s marital 
status is widowed 
 
Respondent’s marital 
status is divorced 
 
Number of children 
resident in the 
household 
 
Male = 1, female = 0 
 
Age of respondent in years 
 
 
Age of respondent in years, 
squared 
 
Respondent’s marital status is 
single = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Respondent’s marital status is 
married/ cohabiting = 1, 0 
otherwise 
 
Respondent’s marital status is 
widowed = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Respondent’s marital status is 
divorced = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
Number of children under the 
ages of 17 (RoI) and 19 (NI) 
resident in the household 
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No. of children under age 18 in 
household missing 
 
 
ISCED 1 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 3-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 5 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED 6 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED missing 
Dummy for missing 
data on number of 
children <18 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as No 
Qualifications or 
equivalent 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as GCSEs 
(NI) / Junior 
Certificate (RoI) or 
equivalent 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as A-
Level (NI) / Leaving 
Certificate (RoI) or 
equivalent 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as sub-
Degree level Higher  
or Further Education 
 
Respondent reports 
highest level of 
qualification as 
Degree level or 
higher  
 
Dummy for missing 
data on highest 
qualification level 
 
Missing =1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
ISCED1 = 1, 0 otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED2 = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED3/4 = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED5 = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
ISCED6 = 1, 0 otherwise 
 
 
 
 
 
Missing =1, 0 otherwise 
 
Note: * SIC Codes: G=Wholesale & retail trade; repair of motor vehicles & motorcycles; I=Accommodation &  
food services activities  and  Human Health &  social work activities. 
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Table A2: Full Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NMW Introduction on 
Employment and Hours in NI, Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
 Employment Weekly Hours 
NI*Post -0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
NI 0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.024*** 
(0.005) 
1998Q3 0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
1998Q4 0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
1991Q1 0.018*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
1999Q2 0.024*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009*** 
(0.003) 
1999Q3 0.030*** 
(0.003) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
1999Q4 0.035*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
2000Q1 0.038*** 
(0.003) 
-0.023*** 
(0.003) 
Age 0.029*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Age2 -0.0005*** 
(0.00001) 
-0.00006*** 
(0.00001) 
Male 0.263*** 
(0.001) 
0.350*** 
(0.002) 
No. children <18 in 
household 
-0.044*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019*** 
(0.001) 
Married 0.044*** 
(0.002) 
-0.037*** 
(0.002) 
Divorced -0.018*** 
(0.004) 
-0.096*** 
(0.005) 
Widowed -0.028*** 
(0.006) 
-0.102*** 
(0.009) 
Constant 0.226*** 
(0.010) 
3.42*** 
(0.011) 
R2 0.135 0.146 
Nobs 463,647 298,473 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. 
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Table A3: Full Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Impacts of the NLW Introduction on 
Employment and Hours in NI, Coefficients (Standard Errors) 
 Employment Weekly Hours 
NI*Post -0.001 
(0.010) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
NI 0.040*** 
(0.007) 
0.055*** 
(0.009) 
2016Q1 -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.035*** 
(0.006) 
2016Q2 0.001 
(0.004) 
0.059*** 
(0.006) 
2016Q3 0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.061*** 
(0.006) 
Age 0.032*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.002) 
Age2 -0.0004*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.00002) 
Male 0.129*** 
(0.003) 
0.299*** 
(0.004) 
No. children <18 in 
household 
-0.038*** 
(0.001) 
-0.029*** 
(0.002) 
Married 0.119*** 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
Divorced -0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.011) 
Widowed -0.021 
(0.014) 
-0.049** 
(0.025) 
ISCED6 0.213*** 
(0.004) 
0.079*** 
(0.005) 
ISCED5 0.161*** 
(0.005) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
ISCED3-4 0.094*** 
(0.005) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
ISCED2 -0.028*** 
(0.005) 
-0.036*** 
(0.007) 
Constant -0.004 
(0.028) 
3.02*** 
(0.038) 
R2 0.099 0.085 
Nobs 91,393 61,329 
***Significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10%. Standard errors are robust. 
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i An alternative test on prior trends is to estimate the model over the whole sample period with both pre and post 
NI-specific dummies (with the former defined as =1 for 1998Q3-1999Q1 and =0 otherwise) and to test whether 
the estimated coefficients on the pre*NI and post*NI dummies are equal. We reject the null hypotheses (of 
equal coefficients) at the 99% level of statistical significance in all four cases.  
ii We do not separately discuss estimated correlations between employment/hours and control variables here, 
which are consistent with what we would expect in all cases. 
iii Research from Maitre et al. (2017) compares the sectoral distribution of minimum wage workers in RoI and 
the UK in 2014 using EU-SILC data, finding that the proportions of minimum wage workers employed in the 
three identified sectors in RoI and the UK stood at 58 and 55 per cent respectively. NI-specific analysis also 
shows these sectors to have high concentrations of minimum wage workers (Department for the Economy, 
2016). 
iv The wild bootstrap approach is warranted because of the potential downward bias of standard cluster-robust 
error estimates when the number of groups is small. In this case the number of groups is nine.   
                                                          
